In Section 1, we presented two types of reciprocal sentences in JA: syntactic and morphological reciprocals. We then adopted the hypothesis that they are structurally parallel and involve a two-place construction even when the complement reciprocal anaphor of the t-marked predicate is realized covertly, as exemplified in (14) and (15).

When it comes to their interpretations, however, “syntactic” and “morphological” reciprocals exhibit differences. First, in the syntactic reciprocal sentence as in (14), the expressed reciprocality can be semantically construed either distributively or collectively. That is, the two subeventualities involved in the reciprocal helping in (14) may have “distributively” occurred at different times and/or in different locations, for example, as in the situation such that the brother financially supported the sister while she went to college and the sister looked after the brother when he became seriously ill in later years. Alternatively, the reciprocal helping in (14) may also have occurred “collectively,” with the involved subeventualities significantly overlapping (spatio)temporally, for example, as in the situation such that the brother and the sister clung to each other and warmed themselves in a cabin when they got lost in a snow-covered mountain (with “complete simultaneity”). Collective reciprocal helping in (14) may also have occurred with somewhat looser, “partial (or situational)” simultaneity, for example, in the situation such that the brother and his sister teamed up and collaboratively finished cleaning the house, the brother vacuuming the floor and the sister wiping the windows and furniture. We define the notions collectivity and distributivity in this particular way in the context of the event semantics (as will be formalized in Section 3). Therefore, caution should be exercised to eliminate any misunderstanding that may arise when these terms are used in some other sense.

The availability of both collective and distributive interpretations in (14) can be confirmed when we observe that this sentence can be felicitously followed either by distributive adjuncts as in (16a–b) or by a collective adjunct as in (16c).8

Reciprocal constructions involving morphologically t-marked verbs as in (15), on the other hand, only permit the collective interpretation, and are thus compatible with the collective but not distributive adjuncts, as shown in (17).9

The same contrast arises even when the reciprocal anaphor baʕð̣-hum 1-baʕð̣ is replaced by an empty anaphor [e]_RECIP (indicated in (17) as the optionality of the overt anaphor).10

Another such pair of “syntactic” and “morphological” reciprocal sentences are presented in (18) below, in which the same contrast can be observed.

Once again, the distributive interpretation available in the syntactic reciprocal in (18a) becomes unavailable in the morphological reciprocal in (18b). Therefore, (18a) is compatible with the situation such that the first businessman haggled with the second businessman over the prices of some items on one occasion and the second businessman haggled with the first businessman over the prices of different items on another occasion. On the other hand, (18b) is compatible only with the situation such that the two businessmen haggled with each other over the prices on a single occasion. Note here that the collectivity in (18b) involves what was identified above as overlapping subeventualities induced by “partial (or situational)” simultaneity. While the mutual haggling took place “collectively” within a single business session, the two businessmen were not necessarily talking to each other at the very same moment. In other words, the overlapping subeventualities required by the t-morpheme in JA can be induced by either complete or partial simultaneity.11

Thus, we now face a task of having to explicate the observed contrast between “syntactic” and “morphological” reciprocals in JA, in particular, why the collective interpretation becomes obligatory only in the latter.

Many researchers have identified and discussed what they call “symmetrical” (or “collective/group-level/mutual”) predicates in English as in (21) below, which permit what can be sensed as reciprocality without requiring an overt reciprocal anaphor (e.g., Lasersohn 1995; Carlson 1998; Link 1998; Peres 1998; Lønning 2011).

Crucially, the “reciprocality” expressed by each verb in (21) does not permit distributed multiple events. “John and Mary kissed,” therefore cannot properly describe, for example, the situation such that Mary kissed John on his cheek after John kissed Mary on her forehead. Carlson (1998: 45) argues that “symmetrical” predicates denote a singular event but their lexically entailed mutuality holding between the atomic individuals of a plural subject induces obligatorily reciprocal and collective interpretations. (See also Link 1998: 7, 49 for a similar analysis.) It seems to be true that the lexical meanings of “symmetrical” predicates induce the sense of simultaneity and mutuality because of the necessarily arising shared experience/situation in the induced eventualities.

One may suspect that such lexical semantics of the involved predicates may also play a crucial role in inducing obligatory collectivity in JA, at least in some of the cases discussed above, e.g., (18b) involving the “symmetrical” predicate faaṣalu ‘haggled’. It indeed is the case that a distributive adjunct is anomalous in (22) below, in which the “symmetrical” verb gaabalu ‘met’ appears even without any reciprocal anaphor present overtly or covertly.

There are reasons, however, to believe that such lexically induced simultaneity is not necessarily the source of the obligatory collectivity we observed in JA (although it seems to be inducing plurality of eventualities). First, as Carlson (1998: 43) notes, the predicates in question behave as “collective” only when they are used intransitively with a plural NP as their subject. The transitive use of kiss in (23a) below, for example, can denote multiple events but no simultaneous or symmetrical entailment arises at least between the atomic individuals of the plural subject John and Mary.

Even when a reciprocal anaphor appears as the object as in (23b), the transitive use of kiss can felicitously describe the distributed multiple events like John’s kissing Mary on the arm and Mary’s kissing John on the arm (observation ascribed to Lila Gleitman). The situation is exactly the same in (24a–b) below, the JA counterpart of (23a–b).

Note now that the sentence in (22) as well involves a two-place construction, and no simultaneity between Bader and Bandar seems to be entailed, suggesting that the obligatory collectivity in this sentence (as per our definition) was not caused by lexically induced simultaneity of the verb gaabalu ‘met’.

Second, even when an identical “symmetrical” verb is used, whether or not it exhibits obligatory collectivity depends on the form it appears in, i.e., whether it is morphologically t-marked or not. Compare, for instance, (25) below with (22) above.

While both sentences involve a symmetrical verb gaabalu ‘met’, a distributive reading is permitted in (25) but not in (22). The contrast in question, in other words, is independent of the symmetricity of the verb itself but rather is dependent on the verb forms.

Various other “symmetrical” verbs also exhibit the contrast in question when they appear in “syntactic reciprocal” sentences on the one hand and in “morphological reciprocal” sentences on the other:

The morphologically unmarked verbs ʕaanagu ‘hugged’ and baawasu ‘kissed’ in (26a) are compatible with both of the adjuncts ‘at the moment the new year began’ and ‘taking turns’, yielding either a collective or distributive interpretation. When the same verbs are morphologically t-marked as in (26b), on the other hand, the distributive adjunct ‘taking turns’ suddenly becomes incompatible. It is true that the distributive adjunct is incompatible even when the morphologically t-marked verbs in (26b) are not accompanied by an overt reciprocal anaphor (indicated by its optionality). Therefore, they may appear to act as an intransitive “genuine” symmetrical verb at first sight. As discussed in Section 1, however, the seemingly intransitive construction here should be analyzed as involving an empty anaphor [e]_RECIP in the complement, and hence lexically entailed simultaneity is unlikely to arise directly between the conjoined subjects.13

Finally, the contrast in question between the t-marked and non-t-marked verbs can be observed even when the verb is non-symmetrical in meaning as in (27) and (28).

(27) is only compatible with the reading that both Bader and Bander forgave Sawsan on one occasion while (28) is compatible with not only such a collective reading but also with a distributive reading: Bader and Bander separately forgave Sawsan, each on a distinct occasion.14

In short, lexically induced simultaneity of predicates should not be regarded as the only source of the obligatory collectivity observed in morphological reciprocals in JA.

Our investigations so far in this section lead us to identify the exact source of the observed obligatory collectivity. Table 1–(i–iii) encapsulate which constructions exhibit optional collectivity and which others obligatory collectivity:

The contrasts shown in (i) indicate that obligatory collectivity is not induced by reciprocal anaphors, whether they are overt or covert. The observations in (ii) tell us that obligatory collectivity in fact can be observed even when no reciprocality whatsoever is involved in the sentence. Finally, the contrast in (iii) demonstrates that obligatory collectivity arises independently of lexically induced mutuality/simultaneity of the so-called “symmetrical” predicates.

While none of reciprocality, mutuality or simultaneity can induce the obligatory collectivity observed in the data listed on the right-hand side of Table 1, there is one thing in common among all of them — the morphological marking of the verbs with the morpheme t-. This observation suggests that obligatoriness of collectivity is either directly induced by or at least coincides with the presence of the morpheme t-. In fact, as illustrated in (29) below, when we eliminate the t-morpheme from the verb in (19) listed under Table 1–(ii), the distributive expression meaning ‘taking turns’ becomes compatible, which further supports this hypothesis. (Note that (29) fills the gap in one of the cells on the left-hand side of Table 1–(ii).)

Thus, while researchers have generally treated the Arabic t-morpheme examined in this section solely as a reciprocal marker, the facts in JA prompt us to reidentify it as a morpheme inducing collectivity rather than reciprocality. In the rest of this work, we would like to pursue this hypothesis and call the t-morpheme in question a “collective morpheme” or “collectivizer.”15 Accordingly, we will pay most of our attention to collectivity, distancing ourselves from the topic of reciprocality in the discussions that follow.

As was introduced in Table 2–a above, F5 is derived when the t-morpheme selects F2 as its input. F2, whose form is characterized by the consonant gemination of the second radical (C₁VC₂C₂VC₃), makes up a causative construction, as illustrated by (39)–(41) below (cf. Wright 1896; Holes 2004; Ryding 2005, among others). (We are suggesting here that F2-unaccusatives should also be regarded as involving causation, extending a traditional view.)

The effect of F5-t-marking then can be regarded as requiring the causer and causee in F2 be united in reference, as illustrated in (42)–(44).

Based upon the interpretations of F5-transitive as in (42) and F5-unergative as in (43), F5-t-morpheme has traditionally been characterized as a “reflexivizer,” while F5-unaccusative as in (44) has been treated separately as (medio)passive (Wright 1896; Ryding 2005). Our extension of the causative analysis of F2 to unaccusatives as in (41), however, makes it possible for us to assimilate all cases of F5 in (42)–(44).

In short, F2 makes up a causative construction, and t-morpheme selecting F2 requires the causer and causee in F2 be united in reference, deriving F5 as a “reflexive” verb.

As was summarized in Table 2–b above, an F6 is derived when the t-morpheme selects F3 as its input. F3 (C₁V₁V₁C₂V₂C₃) is identified by the vowel lengthening taking place in its input verb form F1. F3 verbs often imply some kind of loose symmetricity/parallelism, as in (45a–b).

It is rather difficult to formally characterize the exact semantico-syntactic effect achieved by F3. One descriptive generalization we have managed to come up with, however, is that F3 seems to require the agent argument of the input verb to appear with one more animate (typically human) participant as the initiator of the same eventuality, which in effect paves the way for F3 to involve a plural eventuality under certain conditions to be discussed shortly below. Moreover, what is noteworthy in (45a–b) is that F3-unergatives must appear with an accusative-marked object which is interpreted as an additional agent of the verb. Putting emphasis more on this interpretive effect than its form, we will label this added participant in examples like (45) “agentive object.”21

Similarly, F3-transitives must appear with such an “agentive object” when the object of a transitive verb is inanimate while this extra participant is prohibited when the object is animate, as illustrated by the contrast in each of (46)–(47).22 (Note the distinct positions of * between each pair of sentences.)

In other words, when (and only when) the agent in the input verb is not accompanied by the second animate/human participant, F3 adds an agentive object, which is to be interpreted as an extra initiator of the same action.

On the other hand, since unaccusative verbs do not involve any agent argument to begin with, they cannot appear in F3 at all, as illustrated in (48) below. Note that these sentences are ungrammatical whether the second participant appears as an accusative-marked object or not, and also whatever interpretive role this participant may be intended to play.

Turning now to F6, we have noted that F6-t-morpheme is attached to only those F3s that can yield a plural eventuality. This state of affairs is a natural consequence if F6-t-morpheme is a collectivizer, as argued for in Section 2.4. If only a single eventuality is involved in its input verb form, a collectivizer cannot fulfil its function properly and fails to be interpreted. For instance, while the F3s involving a single eventuality as in (49a–b) below have no problem, the same verbs cannot be turned into F6s, as shown in (50a–b).

If the input F3 involves a plural eventuality, on the other hand, the derived F6 becomes legitimate, with its subeventualities interpreted as obligatorily collective, as we have confirmed with numerous examples in Sections 2.1–2.3. (See (17), (18b), (19), (27), (22) and (26b) listed in the right column of Table 1.)

Having examined all the F6 examples at hand, we have noted that a plural eventuality which their input F3s are required to induce can be established in at least four ways as described in (A)–(D) below.

(A) It is created by parallel subeventualities involving two NPs interpreted as agent as in (51) and (52).

In F6-unergative (51a), for example, the addition of the agentive object induces two parallel subeventualities “the boy laughed” and “his friend laughed.” Similarly in the F6-transitives in (52), the second participant is added as an agentive object within the complement PP and induces an extra subeventuality. Thus, in (52a) for example, two parallel subeventualities “the boy bet money” and “his friend bet money” arise.

(B) A plural eventuality required by the F6-t-morpheme can also be created even when the eventuality does not involve parallel subeventualities if at least one of the two participants is plural in number.

When the input verb is transitive, it does not seem to matter whether this plural participant is interpreted as the subject as in (53) or the complement of the verb as in (54).

At first sight, when the input verb is unergative, the plural subject alone appears to suffice to create a plural eventuality required by the F6-t-morpheme, as exemplified by (55a–b).

One question that arises is why the agentive object required in the input F3 need not appear in F6 here. Since an unergative verb requires an agentive object in F3 even with a plural subject, as shown in (56a–b) below, we cannot consider that the plurality of the subject in (55) alone made the appearance of an agentive object unnecessary.

We would like to claim, however, that the sentences in (55) only appear to involve a one-place construction at surface but in reality involve a two-place construction. In particular, we would like to maintain the hypothesis we adopted in Section 1 and assume that the t-morpheme allows an empty reciprocal anaphor [e]_RECIP to appear as the required agentive object in (55), as shown in (55’).

We may consider that parallel subeventualities are also induced in a crisscrossing fashion here by the reciprocality involved in these sentences, in (55’a) for example, between “each boy (A and B)” and “the other boy (B and A).” Since [e]_RECIP must be anaphoric to a plural subject, a singular subject cannot introduce it, and an (overt) agentive object must appear, as we have already seen in (51). This contrast indirectly supports the postulation of [e]_RECIP in (55’). Moreover, this analysis allows us to capture otherwise improbable reciprocal interpretations detectable in the unergative sentences in (55’) as indicated in their translations.

(C) A plural eventuality required by the F6-t-morpheme can also be created by symmetrical verbs, as exemplified by (57a–b) below. With such verbs, none of the participants need to be plural in number.

We will analyze this case in more detail in Section 4.4 below.

(D) In pursuing the source of a plural eventuality in F6, we have encountered some examples that appear to constitute exceptions to our generalizations. Sometimes, F6 seems to be permitted even when none of (A)–(C) above is achieved, as illustrated by (58)–(60).

That is, F6 seems to be permitted even when a sentence does not involve any of plural participants, parallel subeventualities, or symmetrical verbs. None of these examples involves the second human/animate participant, either. The possibility of F6 in such sentences may suggest some essential inadequacy of the generalization made above. By pushing forward some creative and abstract thinking, however, we can envisage a way to capture cases like (58)–(60) under the proposed generalization.

First, the rejection of a distributive adjunct “from time to time” in these sentences suggests that these sentences all involve obligatory collectivity although such an interpretation is not directly or immediately detectable. Instead, they all seem to convey some implied meanings which may be characterizable as certain types of intensity or exhaustiveness as indicated by “thoroughly,” “completely” and “intensely” in their translations. We would like to claim here that such intensified interpretations are arising because the eventuality involved in each of these sentences can be analyzed as plural, involving the convergence of multifaceted or multi-angled subeventualities. Simply put, we consider that the event of “the man’s discussing the subject” in (58), for instance, was “thorough” because he examined various aspects of the subject. Similarly, “the man’s manipulating the result” in (59) was complete because he maneuvered various significant aspects of the result. As a matter of fact, these sentences can co-occur with the adjuncts indicating a plural eventuality but they cannot co-occur with the adjuncts indicating only a single eventuality, as illustrated in (61a–c).

The suggested analysis of (58)–(60) is also compatible with the observation that the verbs which express a one-time event cannot constitute a similar F6, as already seen in (50a–b).

Finally, even if the proposed account of (58)–(60) is adopted, we must still explain how such a plural eventuality can be made possible with the involvement of only a single initiator of the event. To fulfill this task, we would like to appeal to the notion “guise” proposed by Heim (1998) to explain why the violation of Principles B and C of the binding theory can be evaded in examples like (62a–b), respectively (Reinhart 1983; Higginbotham 1985; Grodzinsky & Reinhart 1993).

In these utterances, the speaker believes, and intends the hearer to believe, that the highlighted NPs are coreferential despite the apparent violation of Principles B and C, respectively, induced by such interpretations. Heim (1998: 214–217) attempts to solve this conundrum by postulating two distinct “guises” of the same referent John and him/he in the given contexts which would lead to different cognitive values. In (62a), for example, John as an admirer and him as the admired appear as two distinct guises. Since the two guises are distinct from each other, they do not give rise to a binding relation in syntax, and hence do not violate Principles B/C. In their semantic interpretation, on the other hand, the interlocutors appeal to their knowledge and/or assumption that the two guises share the same referent and interpret them as coreferential.

Returning now to (58)–(60), we have claimed above that a plural eventuality in these examples is induced by the convergence of multifaceted subeventualities. Then, it probably is not entirely inconceivable that multiple guises as the initiators of such multiple subeventualities appear in these examples. In (59), for example, “the man as one guise addressed the problem from a theoretical angle,” and “the man as another guise addressed the problem from a practical angle,” and so on. Such multiple guises can induce parallel subeventualities while they refer to one and the same participant. The approach adopted in (D) is admittedly exploratory, but it allows us to capture not only the obligatory collectivity but also the otherwise inexplicable source of the intensified interpretation observed in (58)–(60), assimilating them into those discussed in (A)–(C). We will discuss this phenomenon in Section 4.4 below again, which suggests that (D) in fact can be regarded as a quite rational option the grammar of JA permits.

In short, F3 pluralizes an eventuality, requiring the involvement of more than one human (or animate) participant as the initiator of the same eventuality. Then, t-morpheme selecting F3 requires the subeventualities involved there to significantly overlap in time (and location), deriving F6 as a “collective” verb.

F8 is derived when the t-morpheme selects F1 as its input. F8 (ʔiC₁tVC₂VC₃) is derived from F1 (C₁VC₂VC₃) by: (i) t-prefixation (t-C₁) followed by (ii) Flop (C₁t), and (iii) compensatory ʔi-prefixation to avoid both a consonant cluster (#C₁t) and a vowel (#iC₁t) word-initially. (See Wright 1896: 41; McCarthy 1981: 390; among others.) F1 is an inflected but unaugmented verb form, which serves as the foundation in deriving many other verb forms. As already described in Table 2–(c–d) above, F8 sometimes yields reflexivity just as F5 does, but at other times it yields obligatory collectivity just as F6 does. How can we rationalize these phenomena? We will attempt to provide an answer below based upon the following reasoning. When F8 yields a reflexive interpretation, it must be the case that the F1 it selects shares whatever aspect of F2 which activates the “potential reflexivity” of the t-morpheme. Likewise, when F8 yields an obligatory collective interpretation, it must be the case that its input F1 shares the aspect of F3 which activates the “potential collectivity” of the t-morpheme.23 Let us now discuss each of these cases in turn.

First, since the basic function of the t-morpheme as a reflexivizer is to require united reference of the participants within a single eventuality, the only way the input unaugmented verb (F1) can satisfy this requirement would be to provide two participants. This reasoning will lead us to consider that F8 necessarily selects a transitive F1 whose two arguments can enter a felicitous self-related (or intrapersonal) relation when they are interpreted as united in reference, as exemplified in (63).24

Reflexive F8, on the other hand, is never possible with intransitive F1, i.e., unergative or unaccusative verbs.

In short, the reflexivity in F8 is induced more or less in the same way as that in F5, except that the united reference of the participants within a single eventuality is made available by the unaugmented verb (F1) which denotes a self-related (or intrapersonal) relation.25

Next, the t-morpheme as a collectivizer requires the involvement of a plural eventuality in the input verb. In most, if not all, cases of collective F8s, this requirement seems to be fulfilled when the input unaugmented verb (F1) is symmetrical in nature, as in (64a–b).

Both of these sentences exhibit only a collective reciprocal interpretation (e.g., (38d)) and their subjects must be plural (as will be shown directly below in (65a–b)). This set of facts naturally leads us to postulate an empty reciprocal anaphor as an agentive object in these sentences. The collectivity of the t-morpheme in (64a–b), in other words, seems to be activated by the plural eventuality in F1 that is induced perhaps by the combination of (A) (parallel subeventualities), (B) (plural participant) and (C) (symmetrical verbs) discussed in Section 4.2 above.

If we alter the plural subject in (64a–b) into a singular one, on the other hand, an overt agentive object is required to appear (in the PP complement), as in (65a–b).

Here, a plural eventuality was induced by the addition of an agentive object combined with a symmetrical verb ((C)). The situation is similar to (A) but the involved subeventualities are recicprocal rather than parallel. We will discuss this case in more detail in Section 4.4 below.

Thus, the collectivity in F8 is induced more or less in the same way as that in F6, except that (C) seems to be always involved for F8. We have not encountered any collective F8 licensed by (D) (convergence of multifaceted subeventualities), either. As will be discussed directly below in Section 4.4, however, there is a good reason for these restrictions.

Having examined both semantics and morphology of collectivity, we now are ready to rationalize how a plural eventuality is induced with a singular subject in some t-marked collective constructions.

Since the t-morpheme in JA is a collectivizer, it needs to be associated with the operator Coll. Coll in turn needs a plural eventuality to operate on, and hence requires the presence of Dist, as in (66) (cf. (34)).

When the subject is singular and Dist cannot identify a plural eventuality in the sentence, the grammar of JA seems to permit two ways to devise a plural eventuality.

One method is to introduce an agentive object and appeal to the symmetrical property of the involved verb. For instance, as we saw with (51) and (52) in Section 4.2, when the F3 (as the input to the t-marking of F6) implies loose symmetricity/parallelism, the introduction of an agentive object makes parallel subeventualites available, which can be collectivized by F6. When the F3 verbs imply more direct symmetricity (i.e., simultaneity), e.g., race, hug, kiss, and fight, the introduction of an agentive object gives rise to a crisscrossing plural eventuality and hence recipricality. The interpretation derived by this strategy as in (67) below is generally recognized as “discontinuous reciprocality.”26

JA permits another method to devise a plural eventuality with a singular subject. When the input F3 does not imply any kind of symmetricity/parallelism, e.g., help, forgive and blame, the strategy adopted for (51)–(52) and (67) is not available. We believe that a plural eventuality can be devised in such cases with the “guises” of a singular subject, provided that the emerging multifaceted subeventualities are semantico-pragmatically felicitous, as observed with (58)–(60) in Section 4.2. The same strategy is adopted with an asymmetrical F3 as in (68) below, which cannot induce “discontinuous reciprocality.”

The multifaceted subeventualities arising here can be detected by the “intensified” interpretation (a great deal/in many aspects) which suddenly pops up in this sentence. The presence of “discontinuous reciprocality” in (67) and its absence in (68) can also be demonstrated when we see that the reciprocality of the former cannot be negated as in (69a) while the reciprocality of the latter can be negated as in (69b).

Note that (69a) also makes a sharp contrast with (20) in Section 2.2, which involves a plural subject.

The investigation so far has led us to conclude that potential reflexivity of the t-morpheme is activated by the input verb’s capability of involving an intrapersonal (or self-related) relation, and its potential collectivity is activated by a plural eventuality the input verb induces in a sentence.

We have also confirmed that each of such activation is clearly segregated between F5 (for reflexivity) and F6 (for collectivity), but both types of activation can take place in F8. One reasonable interpretation of this state of affairs is that the t-morpheme induces reflexivity when it selects the input verb form in which the required united reference can be satisfied, whether it is F1 (intrapersonal transitive) or F2 (causative). Likewise, the t-morpheme induces obligatory collectivity when it selects the input verb form which can supply a plural eventuality, whether it is F1 (symmetrical transitive) or F3 (unergative or transitive involving two human/animate participants). Then, in a sense, F5, F6 and F8 can be regarded as mere descriptive labels for each of such subcases of activation, as summarized in Table 3.27

Finally, as we have confirmed in Table 2 at the outset of this section, the two potential functions of the t-morpheme as a reflexivizer and a collectivizer are exclusive — if one is possible, the other is not possible. Why do they have to be? The answer comes from the very nature of these two functions. First, reflexivity arises because the t-morpheme requires united reference between the two participants in the eventuality. On the other hand, the obligatory collectivity is induced by the t-morpheme when a plural eventuality is made available by the input verb. If the two participants in a plural eventuality are united in reference, the two subeventualities involved there amount to be induced by one and the same participant, that is, in a singular rather than plural eventuality. The potential collectivity of the t-morpheme therefore would fail to be activated. We thus are led to the conclusion that the two participants in the input subeventualities must be disjoint in reference in order for the potential collectivity of the t-morpheme to be activated. Since the t-morpheme’s reflexivizing function induces united reference and its collectivizing function is realized only with disjoint reference, they are mutually exclusive.

The analysis of verb forms in JA we summarized above is far from being comprehensive and the view pursued in this section is undoubtedly preliminary. We believe, however, that they deserve further scrutiny both by those who find them reasonable and by those who do not, so that we can further advance a formal investigation of the syntactic and semantic aspects of verb morphology in JA, which is only scarcely available in the literature. We also hope that they have a potential to shed light on the semantics of the morphological verbal templates in other Semitic languages as well.